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Autopsy Evidence
Garcon Weiss*
F REQUENTLY DEATH RESULTS in legal problems, either civil or
criminal, the solutions of which depend on the cause of
death. The autopsy (necropsy), or post-mortem examination,
is the scientific method of determining the cause of death.
An autopsy is the careful inspection of the external and
internal structures of the body. There are two types of autopsy,
the medical autopsy and the medico-legal autopsy.'
The medical autopsy is the routine examination of the body
of a person who had been treated in the hospital. Its ultimate
goal is to verify the diagnosis made prior to death and to evaluate
the results of treatment and surgery, thus increasing the store
of medical knowledge. Such results also furnish an indication
of the standard of medical practice in the hospital. The Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals desires that autopsies
be performed in at least twenty percent of hospital deaths, and
the American Medical Association requires an autopsy in at least
twenty-five percent of hospital deaths, for approval of an intern
training program.2
The medico-legal autopsy is performed in order to determine
whether death was the result of natural disease or violence.
The ultimate objective is to ascertain facts which may be used
as substantive evidence to prove or disprove circumstances or
conditions indicating legal responsibility. As a result of an
autopsy, it may be possible to ascertain whether death was
criminally induced, whether an insurance contract must be paid,
whether death is compensable under Workmen's Compensation
or is the result of a tort actionable in a civil case, and finally
whether death is traumatic or natural. For example, autopsy
may show that a death which appears natural, i.e., heart attack,
actually is the result of a blood clot formed in the extremity
after an injury there, which traveled to the lung, causing a fatal
pulmonary embolism which but for the injury would not have
occurred.3
* B.S. in Pharmacy, Ohio State University, Senior at Cleveland-Marshall
Law School.
1 Gerber, Postmortem Examinations, 6 Clev.-Mar. L. Rev. 194 (1957).
2 Hospital Law Manual, Attorney's Volume II, Consents 11: 1 (1959), Health
Law Center, University of Pittsburgh.
3 Use of Medical Evidence in Death Cases to Show "Traumatic or Natural
Causes," 6 Curr. Med. for Attys. 37 (Feb. 1959).
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Performance of a medical autopsy without authorization
constitutes a wrong for which damages may be recovered. Per-
sons having the right of sepulture also have the right to refuse
to permit an autopsy and to place limitations and restrictions
on the consent given as to the areas to be examined. Violation
of such limitations makes the violator liable for damages.
Generally, the rule recognized in the United States is that
those entitled to possession and custody of a body for sepulture
have certain legal rights to and in the body of the decedent. Any
interference with the rights, such as dissecting or mutilating the
body, is an actionable wrong.4 Many states have enacted statutes
indicating from whom such authorization should be obtained.
Some jurisdictions allow a decedent to consent in writing, prior
to death, for autopsy of his remains. Generally the statutes
provide that surviving spouse, father, mother or child may give
consent, or that authorization by any one of the persons listed
in the statute who has assumed custody of the body for burial
is sufficient.
Ohio Revised Code, Section 313.14, indicates an order of
preference for custody of the body of a deceased. Authorization
to perform an autopsy should be obtained from the nearest
living kin of the deceased available to give consent and from the
person assuming custody of the deceased's body for burial as
well, if such person is not the nearest living kin.5
Where there is no specific statutory indication as to authori-
zation, the statutes and cases dealing with the devolution of legal
responsibility for burial must be examined. In addition there
must be recognition of the decedent's rights regarding disposition
of his remains.
In every state of the United States certain public officials
are empowered by statute to perform or to authorize
autopsies in order to determine cause of death when cir-
cumstances indicate medico-legal significance. This authority
may in some instances be limited to cases where violence
or an unlawful act is supposed to have caused death before
autopsy is permitted.6
4 Hospital Law Manual, Attorney's Volume H, Consents 11:2 (1959) Health
Law Center, University of Pittsburgh.
5 See also, Hospital Law Manual, Attorney's Volume II, Consents 11:28
(1959) Health Law Center, University of Pittsburgh.
6 Gerber, Postmortem Examinations, 6 Clev.-Mar. L. Rev. 194, 198 (1957).
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Ohio Revised Code Section 313.137 places the decision as to
necessity for autopsy in the discretion of the coroner.
Wisconsin has passed a "model autopsy law' 8 in connection
with medical autopsies, to remove some of the difficulty en-
countered in obtaining consent:
Consent for licensed physician to conduct a post mortem
examination of the body of a deceased person shall be
deemed sufficient when given by whichever one of the
following assumes custody of the body for purposes of burial:
father, mother, husband, wife, child, guardian, next of kin,
on the absence of any of the foregoing a friend or person
charged by law with the responsibility for burial. If two
or more of such persons assume custody of the body, consent
by one of them shall be deemed sufficient.
This article is limited to the use of the autopsy for medico-
legal purposes, i.e., for obtaining and submitting evidence.
It appears that while the autopsy can give valuable infor-
mation, it must follow the path laid down by the formal rules
of evidence. In Ogilvie v. Aetna Life Insurance Company9 it was
held that a written report made by the county autopsy surgeon
to the coroner and filed with the county clerk was inadmissible
as hearsay:
It was an unsworn statement not subject to cross-
examination made by a stranger to this action....
The Court noted that public records "are made receivable as
prima facie evidence by virtue of express provision of statute,"
but none was there cited. The case was cited in McGowan v.
City of Los Angeles,'0 so that it appears that an autopsy report
is inadmissible as evidence except by express statutory provision.
For example, under Ohio Revised Code, Section 313.10:
The records of a coroner made by himself or by some-
one acting under his supervision are public records, and such
records or copies certified by the coroner shall be received
in evidence as to the facts contained therein.
This was cited and followed in both Carson v. Metropolitan Life
Insurance Company" and Perry v. Industrial Commission.
12
7 See Baldwin's Ohio Revised Code, 1958.
8 West's Wis. Stat. Ann. Sec. 155.05 (1957).
9 189 Cal. 406, 209 P. 26, 27 (1922).
10 223 P. 2d 862, 865 (Cal. 1950).
11 156 Ohio St. 104, 100 N. E. 2d 197 (1951).
12 160 Ohio St. 520, 524, 525, 117 N. E. 2d 34 (1954).
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However, the two cases are distinguishable. In the Carson case
the report was inadmissible because of the opinion therein.
The preferred statement was merely an expression of
opinion by the coroner that decedent committed suicide,
since no one witnessed the killing.
In the Perry case the report was admissible because signed by
the attending physician, "... who had personal knowledge of the
fact of the cause of death."
Another Ohio case, Armstrong v. Travelers Insurance Co.,1 3
preceding the aforementioned Oglivie v. Aetna Life case, held
that:
An autopsy paper, signed by the physicians making the
post-mortem examination is not admissible as substantive
evidence, where the signatures had not been placed under
oath and privilege of cross-examination was not accorded,
but such paper may be used for the purpose of refreshing
the memory of witnesses.
The weight of the authority permits the autopsy report to
be admitted in evidence as proof of the facts therein, but not
as to the opinions expressed. An exception appears in Arizona,
where the statute "expressly directs the coroner to state whether
the death appears accidental, suicidal, or homicidal." The Ari-
zona court held that the opinion should have been admitted in
evidence along with the rest of the certificate. 14
As to the opinions expressed by the physician who made the
autopsy, there is general agreement that his testimony is ad-
missible as the opinion of an expert witness.
In Texas State Highway Department v. Fillmon,15 a work-
men's compensation case, the court held (syllabus 3):
Physician in autopsy on employee was properly per-
mitted to testify that employee died as result of heat stroke,
or that his opinion was based on facts proved at trial.
In this case the physician testified from both personal experi-
ence, having helped at the autopsy, and from expert knowledge
based on hypothetical questions.
In Shepherd v. The Midland Mutual Life Insurance Com-
pany16 a brief statement of the general rule is that:
13 4 Ohio App. 46 (1914).
14 Calif. State Life Insurance Co. v. Fuqua, 10 P. 2d 958, 963 (Ariz. 1932).
15 242 S. W. 2d 172 (Tex. 1951).
16 152 Ohio St. 6, 87 N. E. 2d 156 (1949).
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Where ultimate fact for jury is one depending on inter-
pretation of scientific facts beyond the comprehension of jury,
witness may express opinion as to probability or actuality
of fact pertinent to an issue and admission of such opinion
does not constitute invasion of province of jury, though such
opinion was on ultimate fact.
Furthermore:
A medical expert's opinion as to cause of death, when
cause is pertinent, may be admitted, if it appears the witness
attended the person during his illness or examined his body
after death.
In Commonwealth v. Borasky17 it was even held that, despite
statutes requiring the medical examiner to make an autopsy
and to make and file a record thereof, testimony of the physician
who performed the autopsy as to his observations of the condition
revealed by the autopsy is not incompetent on the ground of the
record being the best evidence.
The requirements of notice as to performing an autopsy
may affect admissibility of the results into evidence where notice
is a statutory requirement, particularly in workmen's compensa-
tion cases. For example see General American Tank Car Corpo-
ration v. Zapala,18 citing Indiana Workmen's Compensation Law
Section 27 requiring timely notice. Failure of notice made the
results inadmissible on motion of the adverse party. The court
also held that unseasonable request for autopsy worked a waiver
of the statutory notice for such autopsy (four months having
elapsed before the giving of such notice).
The problem of notice arises often as a result of a clause in
an insurance policy giving the insurer the right to an autopsy.
In Gath v. The Traveler's Insurance Company'9 the demand for
an autopsy was made several months after death, though agents
of the Company were aware of the insured's death thirty hours
before burial. The Court said:
Autopsy clauses as we have here, are construed strictly
by the courts in favor of the insured and require a demand
for autopsy to be made before burial, especially when the
death of the insured is known to the agents of the company
and it has reasonable grounds to believe that it was not
caused by accidental means.
'7 214 Mass. 313, 101 N. E. 377, 379 (1913).
18 10 N. E. 2d 762, 764 (Ind. 1937).
19 113 Ohio St. 369, 374, 143 N. E. 389 (1925).
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Evidence obtained from autopsy is generally admitted, where
no notice to the accused is given, in cases of homicide. In King
v. State20 the court said that lack of notice did not render the
evidence inadmissible but only affected its credibility. In Lowe v.
People21 the accused lived in Colorado, and the deceased was
buried in Illinois though the murder occurred in Colorado. The
court held:
In a murder prosecution disclosures of autopsy per-
formed on body of decedent in another state held admissible
though defendant was given no notice that the proceeding
was contemplated and had no legal representative in at-
tendance.
And in Benge v. Commonwealth,22 another homicide case, it was
held:
In murder prosecution bullets and other evidence ob-
tained from making post mortem examination of deceased
five months after his death without notice to accused were
admissible.
Lack of notice did not affect admissibility in Sun Accident
Association v. Olson,23 but the court said that secrecy or partisan
character in the proceedings of an autopsy might affect its weight
and influence with the jury.
Where refusal to permit an autopsy was characterized by
the insurer as an admission as to the cause of death, the court in
Vulcan Detinning Company v. Industrial Commission 24 held that:
Refusal to permit autopsy was not an admission and
raised no presumption as to the cause of death.
It might be noted that the refusal was made after burial.
In a recent case 25 an autopsy was made on the body of the
deceased, but the coroner, because of his physical and mental
condition, could not be produced as a witness at the trial of the
accused. The report itself, however, was admitted. The defend-
ant claimed error because of insufficient evidence to prove the
corpus delicti. The court said:
The corpus delicti in homicide cases may be established
without the aid of testimony pertaining to coroner's autopsy.
20 19 S. W. 110 (Ark. 1892).
21 76 Colo. 603, 234 P. 169 (1925).
22 97 S. W. 2d 54 (Ky. 1936).
23 59 Ill. App. 217 (1895).
24 128 N. E. 917, 920 (ill. 1920).
25 Commonwealth v. Fletcher, 128 A. 2d 897, 899 (Pa. 1957).
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Where autopsy is essential to produce evidence for determi-
nation of the issues of a case, a court in its discretion may so
order. In Kusky v. Laderbush26 the plaintiff sued for injury re-
sulting from an auto accident to the extent of $25,000, but died
and was buried before trial of the cause. The defendant motioned
the trial court for an autopsy on the deceased on the ground that
plaintiff died of cancer, but was refused. On appeal the Supreme
Court of New Hampshire held that the defendant was entitled
to an autopsy even though he had other sources of evidence.
They based their holding on the ground that a court had the
power to order an autopsy if, in its discretion, it was in the
interest of the public good or where the demands of justice re-
quired an autopsy.
In Ullendorf v. Brown,27 a probate court ordered an autopsy
to determine heirship. On death of one Jennie Ullendorf, two
persons claimed, as her children, two-thirds of her estate. The
plaintiff, her third husband, claimed that the children were not
those of the deceased but were twins born of another mother in
a maternity ward and given to the deceased shortly thereafter
and never legally adopted by the deceased and her first husband.
Plaintiff's bill stated that all persons by whom he could prove
that the defendants were not the children of the deceased were
dead, and sought a court order for disinterment and autopsy to
determine whether the deceased had ever borne a child. The
court said:
o . . we think it entirely within the power and province
of the probate judge having jurisdiction, in the exercise of
sound judicial discretion, and for the purpose of proving
justice and preventing fraud to enter an order directing
that the body be exhumed and an autopsy be performed for
such purpose, and that findings of the persons making the
autopsy be made available in the trial of the cause.
In Traveler's Insurance Company v. Welch, 28 the court said:
Even where there was no autopsy clause in a disputed
insurance, a court of equity was held able to order exhuma-
tion and autopsy because of its power to defeat fraud and
perpetuate evidence,
citing Mutual Life Insurance v. Griesa,29 where the court ordered
an autopsy to aid the insurer's defense of suicide by poisoning as
26 96 N. H. 286, 74 A. 2d 546 (1950).
27 156 Fla. 655, 24 S. 2d 37, 40 (1945).
28 82 F. 2d 799, 802, 803 (5th Cir. 1936).
29 156 F. 398, 399 (Circ. Ct. D. Kan. 1907).
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against the beneficiary's claim of death due to a fall from a
house roof.
The statutory privilege8 0 accorded to the physician-patient
relation does not affect the admissibility into evidence of the
result of an autopsy where the physician performing the autopsy
did not treat the deceased during his life, as the privileged
relation did not exist. This is the weight of authority, and is in
accord with the reason for the privilege, namely to encourage
the patient to disclose freely all facts material to his condition,
thus facilitating treatment without the fear of disclosure of con-
fidential facts. A physician who is a stranger to the deceased
during life cannot create the physician-patient relation with a
corpse.3 1 Traveler's Insurance Company v. Bergeron 2 is illustra-
tive. The autopsy was performed at the request of the treating
physician by the pathologist of the hospital where the insured
was treated and died, but he had no hand in the patient's treat-
ment. It was held that the privilege did not exist because the
physician-patient relation did not exist. The same court said:
Of course where the physician who performs the autopsy
was the physician of the deceased person during the latter's
lifetime, such physician, in disclosing the facts obtained
through the autopsy, must not be permitted either directly
or indirectly to disclose facts which come to him when the
professional relation existed.
Where the physician performing the autopsy is also the
doctor who treated the deceased as a patient there is a conflict
of opinion as to whether the results of the autopsy are admissible
in evidence. A great preponderance of the cases holds that if the
physician-patient relation existed the results of an autopsy per-
formed by the physician are not admissible. In Bendford v.
National Life and Accident Insurance Company3 3 the doctor who
performed the autopsy on the decedent attended the decedent for
twelve days prior to death. The autopsy was permitted by con-
sent of the plaintiff widow. The doctor in his testimony testified
that his conclusions and opinion were based on the record made
in connection with decedent's treatment before death as well as
on the findings of the autopsy. The court held that:
80 Baldwin's Ohio Revised Code Ann. Sec. 2317.02, for example.
31 Ann. 58 A. L. R. 1134; Ferguson v. Quaker City Life Ins., 146 A. 2d 580,
583 (1958); DeWitt, Privileged Communications between Physicians and Pa-
tient, 130 et seq. (1958).
32 25 F. 2d 680, 683 (8th Circ. 1928).
88 356 Mich. 52, 96 N. W. 2d 113 (1959).
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. . . testimony concerning the autopsy findings of the
deceased insured and information obtained in treatment of
the insured by an attending physician were privileged and
inadmissible.
In Sprouse v. Magee,34 a case for the wrongful death of the
wife as a result of malpractice, the plaintiff on appeal claimed
error in rejection of the evidence acquired by the treating doctors
in connection with the treatment and as a result of autopsy.
Held, that the right to waive the privilege of a physician as evi-
dence survives, and may be exercised after the death of the
patient by the heirs as well as by the deceased's personal repre-
sentative.
As to evidence obtained from an autopsy, we have no
hesitancy in saying such is not privileged, when not depend-
ent upon, and when capable of being by the physician segre-
gated from, information which he received as an attending
physician.35
In Mathews v. Rex Health and Accident Insurance Com-
pany36 plaintiff sued as beneficiary of her son's insurance contract.
The boy died as a patient in City Hospital of Indianapolis, and
an autopsy was made by the hospital pathologist without consent
of the parent. The pathologist was not the attending physician.
On plaintiff's objection to the admissibility of the pathologist's
testimony as to the cause of death, the appellate court held that
the testimony was inadmissible, commenting that the autopsy was
held without anyone's consent and could result only through
the relation of the patient with the hospital. The pathologist was
treated as the assistant of the treating physician and the privilege
maintained. The court said:
Can a hospital, immediately after death of one of its
patients discharge the physician who had attended the patient
up to the time of death, and thereafter rush the dead body
to the morgue and direct the physician at the head of the
pathologist department to perform an autopsy, and thus
evade the statute which sealed the lips of the first physician?
We think these questions should be answered in the nega-
tive, and that a physician under those circumstances steps
into the shoes of the attending physician holding the autopsy
at the direction of the latter, and that the information ac-
quired by him through the autopsy is privileged.
34 46 Ida. 622, 269 P. 993, 997 (1928).
35 Id., at 997.
36 157 N. E. 467, 471 (Ind. 1927)-Discussion of privilege as related to
autopsies.
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It will be noted that the facts are practically identical with those
in Traveler's Insurance Company v. Bergeron above.
Admissibility of photographs of a deceased taken at autopsy
lie in the sound discretion of the trial judge. If the principal
effect of the photograph is to arouse the passions of the jury and
to prejudice the defendant because of the gruesome details, the
demonstrative evidence will be excluded, but if the probative
value as to a fact in issue outweighs the effect of prejudice to
the defendant, it will be admitted.37 In Carter v. People38 the
autopsy surgeon used colored slides to show the nature of the
wound and then described the type of instrument that would be
required to inflict them. It was held that admission of the slides
was not an abuse of the trial court's discretion under the cir-
cumstances because the court warned the jury not to be preju-
diced by them.
Photographs showing incisions and sutures in performing
an autopsy were held inadmissible in St. Lukes Hospital Associa-
tion v. Long39 a civil case, because:
The cause of death was firmly established without dis-
pute that there could be no substantial testimonial value in
the picture.
And in Oxendine v. State,40 a homicide case, the showing of
colored slides was held to be prejudicial in view of testimony
that the victim died instantly of gunshot wounds:
. . . they had no probative value in establishing any
issue in the case but were a mere appeal to passion and
prejudice of the jury.
Where the issue of "illegal search and seizure" was raised
in connection with an unauthorized autopsy, the Court of Appeals
of Kentucky in Streipe v. Hubbuch Brothers & Wellendorf,41 a
Workmen's Compensation case involving insurance, held without
deciding as to the legality of the autopsy involved, that the re-
sults were admissible in either instance under the general rule
that the courts do not concern themselves with the method by
which the evidence was obtained so long as it is otherwise ad-
missible. Since the Constitutional protection applied only in a
37 People v. Carter, 48 Cal. 2d 737, 313 P. 2d 665 (1957).
38 Ibid.
39 240 P. 2d 917, 922 (Colo. 1952).
40 335 P. 2d 940 (Okla. 1958).
41 25 S. W. 2d 358, 359 (Ky. 1930).
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criminal case, it was inapplicable in the instant case, and for the
further reason that there was no right of property in a dead body.
We therefore conclude that a corpse is not a possession,
and that a post mortem examination is not an unreasonable
search and seizure within the contemplation of the Constitu-
tion.
This line of reasoning was followed in the homicide case of
People v. Franszkiewicz,42 where the court cited and followed
the Streipe case, rejecting the appellant's contention that the
result of the unauthorized autopsy, not made in strict compliance
with the statute,
... was inadmissible, for the same reason that testimony
obtained by the unlawful use of a search warrant is held to
be incompetent and inadmissible.
The Court held that the testimony obtained was admissible.
The courts have recognized the autopsy as a valuable aid
in gathering evidence, and have uniformly supported the en-
forcement of autopsy clauses in insurance contracts,43 , 4 4 subject
only to the rule that demand must be reasonably and seasonably
made.45, 46 Autopsy rights usually appear in insurance contracts
in connection with double indemnity clauses as a prerequisite to
payment.
To conclude, autopsy results are subject to the same use,
abuse, and rules as is any other evidence. The trial judge largely
passes on admissibility of results of autopsy as with other evi-
dence, and indeed the autopsy may be the only source of aid to
him in determining controversies. It appears to this writer that
their use in the main has been very satisfactorily handled, and
that the autopsy will remain an important evidentiary tool.
42 4 N. W. 2d 500, 503 (Mich. 1942).
43 Patterson v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Co., 84 S. 2d 127 (1955).
44 Cohen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 207 Misc. 266, 138 N. Y. S.
2d 794 (Sup. Ct. Kings Co. 1955).
45 45 C. J. S. Sec. 1070, pp. 1309-10.
46 Gath v. Traveler's Insurance Co., supra n. 19.
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